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TAGS: [SOCI](#) [PHUM](#) [KFEM](#) [UNGA](#)
SUBJECT: ANTI-RAPE RESOLUTION UPDATE

Classified By: AMBASSADOR GROVER JOSEPH REES for reasons 1.5(b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Negotiations on the text of the U.S.-initiated anti-rape resolution are heading into the end-game. Over 50 countries, including the European Union and others from various regions, have signed on as co-sponsors of a compromise text that asks for action to eliminate rape generally, "including" when used to achieve political or military objectives. Fundamental differences still exist, however, with several African delegations who are driving the Africa Group position, particularly regarding their desire to eviscerate the title and the final paragraph which directs the UN Secretary-General to prepare a report on the issue. This Africa Group position is supported by Russia, India, Cuba, and Venezuela. Many Asian and Latin American countries appear to be waiting to see the ultimate reaction of the Africans to the final text before committing to co-sponsor or support our text.

¶2. (C) The possibility of a split within the Africa Group exists, since Liberia, Burundi and DRC are co-sponsors, while Sudan, Egypt, South Africa and a few others remain suspicious of the resolution's aims. Egyptian Permrep Abdelaziz and his mission have been particularly active and unhelpful, both within the Africa Group and within the OIC, in their attempt to shield Sudan from any implied criticism and to block progress on our resolution. Department may wish to consider demarching the GOE at a high level to get Abdelaziz to desist leading the opposition. South Africa has been slightly less vocal than Egypt in playing the spoiler, but another high-level Department demarche may be helpful in Johannesburg as well.

¶3. (C) If a vote is called, it is not yet clear how many Africans will abstain or vote against our resolution, nor how many sympathetic NAM votes they will be able to garner. The addition of an explicit mention of foreign occupation will undercut some of the potential opposition to our text. If there is disagreement within the Africa Group, Cuba is likely to take advantage of this by putting forward several amendments targeted at embarrassing the U.S. and causing us to withdraw our own co-sponsorship. These would aim to reaffirm international agreements we have been unable to ratify, such as the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action on women. Since the vast majority of UN members, including other co-sponsors, could be able to support such language if presented, the EU is working to dissuade Cuba from formally presenting these amendments. EU interlocutors have told USUN they expect Cuba will call a vote on the entire resolution, even if there is no opposition from Africa, in order to deny us a "consensus."

Khalilzad